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THE DIVID IN G LINE
BETWEE.."<

FEDERAL AND LOCAL AUTHORIT_Y,
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN THE TERRITORIES.
UNDER our complex system of government it is the first duty of
American statesmen to mark distinctly the dividing line between
Federal and Local Authority. T o do this with accuracy involves an
inquiry, not only into the powers and duties of the Federal Government under the Constitution, but also into the rights, privileges, and
immunities of the people of the Territories, as well as of the States
composing the Union. The relative powers and functions of the
Federal and State governments have become well understood and
clearly defined by their practical operation and harmonious action for
a long series of years; while the disputed question-involving the
right of the people of the Territories to govern themselves in respect
to their local affairs and internal polity- remains a fruitful source of
partisan strife and sectional controversy. The political organization
which was formed in 1854, and has assumed the name of the Republican Party, is based on the theory that African slavery, as it exists
in this country, is an evil .of such magnitude-social, moral, and political-as to justify and require the exertion of the entire power and
influence of the Federal Government to the full extent that the Constitution, according to their interpretation, will pern;i.it for its ultimate
extinction. In the platform of principles adopted at P hiladelphia by
the Republican National Convention in 1856, it is affirmed:
"That the Constitution confers upon Congress sovereign power over the Territorie9
of the United States for their government, and that in the exercise of this power it i~
both the 1ight and the duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories .those twin relics
of barbarism, polygamy and slavery."

According to the theory of the Republican party there is an irrepressible conflict between freedom and slavery, free labor and slave
labor, free States and slave States, which is irreconcilable, and roust
continue to rage with increasing fury until the one shall become uni-
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versal by the annihilation of the other. In the language of the most
eminent and authoritative expounder of their political faith,

\-

"It is an irrepressible conflict bet"'een opposing and enduring forces; and it means
that the United States must and will, sooner or later, become either entirely a slaveholding nation or entirely a free-labor nation.· Either tbe cotton and rice fields of
South Carolina, and the sugar plantations of Louisiana will ultimately be tilled by
free labor, and Charleston and New Orleans become marts for legitimate merchandise alone, or else the rye fields and wheat fields of Massachusetts and New York must
again be surrendered by their farmers to slave culture and to the production of slaves,
and Boston and New York.become once more markets for trade in the bodies and
souls of men."

In the lliinois canvas~ of 1858 the same proposition was advocated
and defended by the distinguished R epublican standard-bearer in
these words :
"In my opinion it [the slavery agitation] will not cease until a crisis shall have
been reached and passed. 'A house diYided agni11st itself can not stand.' I believe
this government can not endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect- the house to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be di,·idcd. I t will become all
one thirig or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest tho farther
spread of it, nnd place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in
the cow"SC of ultimate extinction, or its advocates wiII push forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States-old as well as new, North as well as South."

Thus it will be seen, that under the auspices of a political party,
which claims sovereignty in Congress over the subject of slavery,
there can be no peace on the slavery question- no truce in the sectional strife-no fraternity between the North and Soutb., so long as
t his Union remains as our fathers made it-divided into free and
slave States, with the right on the part of each to retain slavery so
long as it chooses, and to abolish it whenever it pleases.
On the other hand, it would be uncandid to deny that, while the
Democratic party 1s a unit in its irreconcilable opposition to the doct rines and principles of the Republican party, there are radical differences of opinion in respect to the powers and duties of Congress, and
the rights and immunities of the people of the T erritories under the
F ederal Constitution, which seriously disturb its harmony and threaten its integrity. These differences of opinion arise from the different
interpretations placed on the Constitution by persons who belong to
one of the following classes :
First.-Those who believe that the Constitution of the United
States neither establishes nor prohibits slavery in the States or Territories beyond tho power of the people legally to control it, but
"leaves t he people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate t heir
domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States."
Seconcl.- Those who believe that the Constitution establishes
slavery in the Territories, and withholds from Congress and t he Ter-
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ritorial Legislature the power to control it; and who insist that, in
the event the Territorial Legislature fails to enact the requisite laws
for its protection, it becomes the imperative duty of Congress to interpose its authority and furnish such protection.
TMrd.-Those who, while professing to believe that the Constitution establishes slavery in the Territories beyond the power of Congress or the Territorial Legislature to control it, at the same time
protest against the duty of Congress to interfere for its protection ;
but insist that it is the duty of the Judiciary to protect and maintain
slavery in the Territories without any law upon the subject.
By a careful examination of the second and third propositions, it
will be seen that the advocates of each agree on the theoretical question, that the Constitution establishes slavery in the Territories, and
compels them to have it whether they want it or not; and differ on
the practical point; whether a right secured by the Constitution shall
be protected by an act of Congress when all other remedies fail.
The reason assigned for not protecting by law a right secured by the
Constitution is, that i,t is the duty of the Courts to protect slavery in
the Territories without any legislation upon the subject. How the
Courts are to afford protection to slaves or any other property, where
there is no law providing remedies and imposing penalties and conferring jurisdiction upon the Courts to hear and determine the cases
as they arise, remains to be explained.
The acts of Congress, establishing the several Territories of the
United States, provide that : " The jurisdiction of the several Cow·ts
herein provided for, both appellate and original, and that of the Probate Courts and J ustioes of the Peace, shall be as limited by law"meaning such laws as•the Territorial L egislatures shall from tin1e to
time enact. It will be seen that the judicial tribunals of the Territories have just such jurisdiction, and only such, in respect to the rights
of persons and property }Jertaining to the citizens of the Territory as
the Territorial Legislature shall see fit to confer; and consequently,
that the Courts can afford protection to persons and property no
further than the Legislature shall, by law, confer the jurisdiction, and
prescribe the remedies, penalties, and ntodes of proceeding.
It is difficult to conceive how any person who believes that the
Constitution confers the right of protection in the enjoyment of slave
property in the Territ,ories, rega:i:dless of the wi.:,hes of the people and
of the action of the Territorial Legislature, can satisfy his conscience
and his oath of fidelity to the Constitution in withholding such Congressional legislation as may be essential to the enjoyment of such
right under the Constitution. Under this view of the subject it is
impossible to resist the conclusion that, if the Constitution does establish slavery in the Territories, beyond the power of the people to
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control it by law, it is the imperative duty of Congress to supply all
the legislation necessary to its protection; and if this proposition is
not true, it necessarily results that the Constitution neither establishes
nor prohibits slavery any whei·e, but leaves the people of each State
and 'ferritory entirely free to form and regulate their domestic affairs
to suit themselves, without the intervention of Congress or of any
other power whatsoever.
But it is urged with great plausibility by those who have entire
faith in the soundness of the proposition, that "a Territory is the
mere creature of Congress ; that the creature can not be clothed
with any powers not possessed by the creator; and that Congress,
not possessing the power to legislate in respect to African slavery in
the Territories, can not delegate to a Territorial L egislature any
power which it does not itself possess."
This proposition is as plausible as it is fallacious. But the reverse
of it is true as a general rule. Congress can not delegate to a Territorial Legislature, or to any other body of men whatsoever, any
power which the Constitution has vested in Congress. In other
words: Every power conferred on Congress by the Constitution must
be exercised by Congress in the mode prescribed in the Constitution.
Let us test the correctness of this proposition by reference to the
powers of Congress as defined in the Constitution:
" The Congress shall have power" To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises," ct.c. ;
"To borrow money on the credit of the United States;"
" To regulate commerce with foreign n11itions," etc. ;
''To establish a uniform rule of naturalization," etc. ;
"To coin money, and regulate the value thereof;"
" To establish post-offices and post-roads ;"
"To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;"
" To declare war." etc. ;
. "To provide and maintain a navy."

This list might be extended so as to ®ibrace all the powers conferred on Congress by the Constitution; but enough has been cited
to test the principle. Will it be contended that Congress can delegate any one of these powers to a Territorial Legislature or to any
tribunal whatever? Can Congress delegate to Kansas the power to
"regulate commerce," or to Nebraska the power "to establish uniform rules of naturalization," or to Illinois the power "to coin money
and regulate the value thereof," or to Virginia the power "to establish post-offices and post-roads ?"
The mere statement of the question carries with it the emphatic
answer, that Congress can not delegate any power which it does possess ; but that every power conferred on Congress by the Constitution must be exercised by Congress in the manner prescribed in that
instrument.
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On the other hand, there are cases in which Congress may establish tribunals and local governments, and invest them with powers
which Congress does not possess and can not exercise under the
Constitution. For instance, Congress may establish colll'ts inferior
to the Supreme Court, and confer upon them the power to hear and
determine cases, and render judgments affecting the life, liberty, and
property of the citizen, without itself having the power to hear and
determine such causes, render judgments, or revise or annul the same.
In like mrumer Congress may institute governments for the Territories, composed of an executive, judicial, and legislative department;
and may confer upon the Governor all tho executive powers and
functions of the Territory, without having the right to exercise any
one of those po1vers or functions itself.
Congress may confer upon the judicial department all the judicial
powers and functions of the Territory, without having the right to
hear and determine a cause, or render a judgment, or to revise or annul
any decision made by the courts so established by Congress. Congress may also confer upon the legislative department ofthe Territory
certain legislative powers which it can not itself exercise, and only
such as Congress can not exercise under the CoI1Stitution. The
powers which Congress may thus confer but can not exercise, are
such as relate to the domestic affairs and internal polity of the Territory, and do not affect the general welfare of the Republic.
This dividing line between Federal and Local authority was familiar to the framers of the Constitution. It is clearly defined and distinctly marked on every page of history which records the great
events of that immortal struggle between the American Colonies and
the British Government, which resulted in the establishment of our
national independence. In the beginning of that struggle the Colonies neither contemplated nor desired independence. In all their
addresses to the Crown, and to the Parliament, and to the people of
Great Britain, as well as to the people ofAmerica, they averred that
as loyal British subjects they deplored the causes which impelled
their separation from the parent country. They were strongly and
affectionately attached to the Constitution, civil and political institutions and jurisprudence of Great Britain, which they proudly claimed
as the birth-right of all Englishmen, and desired to transmit them unimpaired as a precious legacy to their posterity. For a long series
of years they remonstrated against the violation of their inalienable
rights of self-government under the British Constitution, and humbly
}letitioned for the redress of their grievances.
They acknowled~ed and affirmed their allegiance to the Crown,
their a4fection for the people, and their devotion to the Constitution
of Gl'eat Britain; and their only complaint was that they were not
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permitted to enjoy the rights and privileges of self-government, in
the management of their internal affairs and domestic concerns, in
accordance with the guaranties of that Constitution and of the colonial charters granted by the Crown in pul'suance of it. They conceded the right of the Imperial government to make all laws and
perform all acts concerning the Colonies, which were in their nature
Imperial and not Ooloniat---which affected the general welfare of the
Empire, and did not interfere with the "internal polity" of the Colonies. They recognized the right of the Imperial government to declare war and make peace; to coin money and determine its value;
to make treaties and conduct intercourse with foreign nations; to
regulate commerce between the several colonies, and between each
colony and the parent country, and with foreign countries; and in
general they recognized the 1·ight of the Imperial government of
Great Britain to exercise all th~ powers and authority which, under
our Federal Constitution, are delegated by the people of the several
States to the Government of the United States.
Recognizing and conceding to the Imperial government all these
powers-including tlie rig/it to institute governments for tlie Oolonies,
by granting charters under which the inhabitants residing within the
limits of any- specified territory might be organized into a political
community, with a government consisting of its appropriate departments, executive, legislative, and judicial; conceding all these powers,
the Colonies emphatically denied that the Imperial government had
any rightful authority to impose taxes upon them without their consent, or to interfere with their internal polity; claiming that it ·was
the birth-right of all Englishmen-inalienable when formed into a
political community-to exercise and enjoy all the rights, privileges,
and immunities of self,government in respect to all matters and
things wnich were Local and not General-Internal and not External-Colonial and not Imperial-as fully as if they were inhabitants of England, with a fair representation in Parliament.
Thus it appears that our fathers of the Revolution were contending, not for Independence in the fu-st instance, but for the inestimable right of Local Self-Government under the British Constitution;
the right of every distinct political community-dependent Colonies,
Tenitories, and Provinces, as well as sovereign States-to make their
own local laws, form their own domestic institutions, and manage
their own internal affairs in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of Great Britain as the paramount law of the Empire.
The government of Great Britain had violated this inalienable right
of local self-government by a long series of acts on a great variety of
subjects. The first serious point of controversy arose on the slavery
question as early as 1699, which continued a fruitful source ofirrita-
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tion until tho Revolution, and formed one of the causes for tho separ::i..tiou of the colonies from tho British Crown.
For more than forty years the Provincial Legislature of Virginia
had passed laws for the protection nnd encouragement of African
slavery within her limits. This policy was steadily pursued until the
white inhabitants ofVirginia became alarmed for their own safety, in
view of the numerous and formidable tribes of Indian savages which
surrounded and threatened the feeble white settlements, while shiploads of African savages were being daily landed in their midst. In
order to check and restrain a policy which seemed to threaten the
very existence of the colony, the Provincial Legislature enacted a law
imposing a tax upon every slave who should be brought into Virginia.
'l'he British merchants, who were engaged in the African slave-trade,
regarding this legislation as injurious to their interests and in violation of their rights, petitionecl the King of England and his Majesty's
ministers to annul the obnoxious law and protect them in their right
to carry their slaves into Virginia and all other British colonies which
were the common property of the Empire-acquired by the common
blood and common treasure-and from which a few adventurers who
had settled on the Imperial domain by bis Majesty's sufferance, had
no right to exclude them or discriminate against their property bJ a
mere Provincial enactment. Upon a full consideration of tho subject
the King graciously granted the prayer of the petitioners; and accordingly issued peremptory orders to the Royal Governor of Virginia, and to the Governors of all tho other British colonies in America, forbidding them to sign or approve any Colonial or Provincial
enactment injurious to tho African Slave-Trade, Wllcss such enactment
should contain a clause suspending its operation until his Majesty's
pleasure should be made known in the premises.
Judge Tucker, in his Appendix to Blackstone, refers to thirty-one
acts of tho Provincial Legislature of Virginia, passed at various periods from 1662 to 1772, upon the subject of African slavery, showing
conclusively that Virginia always considered this as one of the questions affecting her" internal polity," over which she, in common with
the other colonies, claimed "the right of exclusive legislation in their
Provincial Legislatures" within their respective limits. Some ofthese
acts, particularly those which were enacted prior to the year 1699,
were evidently intended to foster and encourage, as well as to regulate and control African slavery, as one of tho domestic institutions
of the colony. The act of 1699, and most of the enactments subsequent to that date, were as obviously designed to restrain and check
tho growth of the institution with the view of confining it within the
limit of tho actual necessities of the community, or its ultimate extinction, as might bo deemed most conducive to the public interests,
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by a system of unfriendly legislation, such as imposing a tax on all
slaves introduced into the colony, which was increased and renewed
from time to time, as occasion required, until the period of the Revolution. Many of these acts never took effect, in consequence of the
King withholding his assent, even after the Governor bad approved
the enactment, in cases where it contained a clause suspending its
operation until his Majesty's pleasure should be made known in the
premises.
In 1772 the Provincial Legislature of Virginia, after imposing another tax of five per cent. on all slaves imported into tbe colony, pet itioned the King to remove all those restraints which inhibited his
Majesty's Governors assenting to such laws as might check so very
pernicious a cow.merce as slavery. Of this petition Judgc Tucker
says:
" The following extract from a petition to the Throne, presented from the House
of Burgesses of Virginia, 4-pril Jst, 1772, will show the sense of the people of Virginia
on the subject of slavery at that period :
" 'The importation of slaves into the colony from the coast of Africa hath Jong
been considered as a trade of great inhumanity; and under its present encouragement we have too much reason to fear will endanger the very existence of your
Majesty's American dominions. ' "

Mark the ominous words I Virginia tells the King of England in

1'7'72, four years prior to the Declaration of Independence, that his

Majesty's American dominions are in danger : Not because of the
Stamp duties-not because of the tax on Tea-not because of his attempts to collect rev.enue in America! These have since been deemed sufficient to justify rebellion and revolution. But none of these
are referred to by Virginia in her address to the Throne-there being
another wrong which, in magnitude and enormity, so far exceeded
these and all other causes of complaint that the very existence of bis
Majesty's American dominions depended upon it l That wrong consisted in forcing African slavery upon a dependent colony without her
consent, and in opposition to the ,vishes of her own people I
The l)eople of Virginia at that day did not appreciate the force of
the argument used by the British merchants, who were engaged in
the African slave-trade, and which was afterward indorsed, at least
by implication, by the King aud his Ministers; that the Colonies
were the common property of the Empire-acquired by the common blood and treasure-and therefore all British subjects had the
right to carry their slaves into the Colonies and hold them in defiance
of the local 1aw and in contempt of the wishes and safety of the
Colonies.
The people of Virginia not being convinced by this process of
reasoning, still adhered to the doctrine whieh they held in common
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with their sister colonies, that it was the birth-right of all freemeninalienable when formed into political communities-to exercise exclnsirn legislation in respect to all matters pertaining to their internal polity-slavery not excepted ; and rather than surrender this
great right they were prepared to withdraw their allegiance from the
Crown.
.Again referring to this petition to the King, the same learned
Judge adds:
"This petition produced no effect, as appears from the first clause of our [rirginiti) Constitution, where, among other acts of misrule, the inhuman use of the
Royal negative in refusing us [the people of Virginia] permission to exclude slavery
from us by law, is enumerated among the reasons for separating from Great Britain."

Jl

•

This clause in the Constitution of Virginia, referring to tho inhuman use of tho Royal negative, in refusing tho Colony of Virginia
permission to exclude slavery from her limits by law, as one of the
reasons for separating from Great Britain, was adopted on tho 12th
day of June, 1776, three weeks and one day previous to the Declaration oflndependence by tho Continental Congress; and after remaining in force as a part of the Constitution for a period of fifty-four
years, was re-adopted, without alteration, by tho Convention which
framed the new Constitution in 1830, and then ratified by tho people
as a part of the new Constitution; and was again re-adopted by the
Convention which amended the Constitution in 1850, and again ratified by the people as a J)art of the amended Constitution, ancl at this
day remmns a portion of the fundamental law of Virginia- proclaiming to the world and to posterity that one of the reasons for separating from Great Britain was "the inhuman use of the Royal negative
in refusing us [the Colony of Virginia] permission to exclude sl:wery
from us by law!"
The legislation of Virginia on this subject may be taken as a fair
sample of the legislative enactments of each of the thirteen Colonies,
showing conclusively that slavery was regarded by them all as a domestic question to be regarded ancl clcterminecl by each colony to
suit itself, without th" intervention of the British Parliament or "the
inhuman use of the Royal negative." Each colony passed a series
of enactments, beginning at an early period ofits hi.story and rnnning
clown to tho commencement of the Revolution, either protecting,
regulating, or restraining African Slavery within its respective limits
and in accordance with their wishes and supposed interests. North
and South Carolina, following the example of Virginia, at first encouraged the introduction of slaYes, until the number increased beyoncl their wants and necessities, when they attempted to check and
restrain the further growth of the institution, by imposing a high rate
of taxation upon all slaves which should be brought into those colo-
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nies ; and finally, in 1764, South Carolina passed a law imposing a
penalty of one hundred pounds (or five hundred dollars) for every
negro slave subsequently introduced into that colony.
The Colony of Georgia was originally founded on strict anti-slavery principles, and rigidly maintained this policy for a series of years,
until the inhabitants became convinced by experience, that, with their
climate and productions, slave labor, if not essential to their existence,
would prove beneficial and useful to their material interests. JUarylancl and Delaware prntected and regulated .African Slavery as one
of their domestic institutions. Pennsylvania, under the advice of
William Penn, substituted fourteen years' service and perpetual adscript to the soil for hereditary slavery, and attempted to legislate,
not for the total abolition of slavery, but for the sanctity of marriage
among slaves, and for their personal security. New Jersey, New
York, and Connecticut recognized African Slavery as a domestic institution lawfully existing within their respective limits, and passed
the r equisite laws for its control and regulation.
Rhode Island provided by law that no slave should serve more
than ten years, at the end of which time be was to be set free; and
if the master should refuse to let him go free, or sold him elsewhere
for a longer period of service, he was subject to a penalty of forty
pounds, which was supposed at that period to be nearly double the
value of the slave.
Massachusetts imposed heavy taxes upon all slaves brought into
the colony, and provided in some instances for sending the slaves
back to their native land; and finally prohibited the introduction of
any more slaves into the colony under any circumstances.
When New H ampshire passed laws which wore designed to prevent the introduction of any more slaves, the British Cabinet issued
the following order to Governor Wentworth : "You are not to give
your assent to, or pass any law imposing duties upon Negroes impo1ted into New Hampshire."
While the legislation of the several colonies exhibits dissimilarity
of views, founded on a diversity of interests, on the merits and policy
of slavery, it shows conclusively that they all regarded it as a domestic question affecting their internal polity in respect to which t hey
were entitled to a full and exclusive power of legislation in the several provincial Legislatures. For a few years immediately preceding
the American R evolution the .African Slave-Trade was encouraged
and stimulated by the British Government and carried on with more
vigor by the English merchants than at any other period in the history of the Colonies ; and this fact, taken in connection with the extraordinary claim asse1ted in the memorable Preamble to the act repealing the Stamp duties, that "Parliament possessed the right to
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bind the Colonies in all cases whatever," not only in respect to all
matters affecting the general welfare of the empire, but also in regard
to the domestic relations and internal polity of the Colonies-produced a powerful impression upou the minds of the colonists, and imparted peculiar prominence to the principle involved inthe controYersy.
Hence the enactments bythe several colonial Legislatures calculated
and designed to restrain and prevent the increase of slave!l; and, on
the other hand, the orders issued by the Crown instructing the colonial Gov.ernors not to sign or permit any legislative enactment prejudicial or injm·ious to the African Slave-Trade, unless such enactment
should contain a clause suspending its operation until the royal pleasure should be made lmown in the premises ; or, in other words, until the King should have an opportunity of annulling the acts of the
colonial Legislatures by the "inhum:i.n use of the Royal negative."
Thus the policy of the Colonies on the slavery question hacl assumed a direct antagonism to that of the British Government; and
this antagonism not only added to the importance of the principle of
local self-government in the Colonies, but produced a general concurrence of opinion and action in respect to the question of slavery in
the proceedings of the Continental Congress, which assembled at
Philadelphia for the first time on the 5th of September, 1774.
On the 14th of October the Congress adopted a Bill ofRights for
the Colonies, in the form of a series of resolutions, in which, after conceding to the British Government the power to regulate commerc.e
and do such other things as affected the general welfare of the empire without interfering with the internal polity of the Colonies, they
declared "That they are entitled to a free and exclusive power in
their several provincial Legislatures, where their right of representation can alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal
polity." Having thus defined the principle for which they were contending, the Congress proceeded to adopt the following " Peaceful
:M:easmes," which they still hoped would be sufficient to induce compliance with their just and reasonable demands. These "Peaceful
l\feasures" consisted of addresses to the King, to the Parliament, and
to the people of Great Britain, together with an Association of NonIntercourse to be observed and maintained so long as their grievances
should remain unredressed.
The second :u'ticle of this Association, which was adopted without
opposition and signed by the Delegates from all the Colonies, was in
these words :
"Thnt we ,\ill neither import nor purchase any slave imported after the first day
of December next; nfter which time we will wholly discontinue the Slave-Trade,
and will neither be concerned in it ourselves, nor will we hire our vessels, nor sell
our commodities or manufactures to those who are engaged in it."
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This Bill of Rights, together with these articles of association, were
subsequently submitted to and adopted by each of the thirteen Colonies in their respective provincial Legislatures.
Thus was distinctly formed between the Colonies and the parent
country that issue t1pon which the Declaration of Independence was
founded and the battles of the R evolution were fought. I t involved
the specilic claim on the part of the Colonies-denied by the King
and Parliament-to tho exclusive right of legislation touching :ill
local ancl internal concorus, slavery included. This being the principle inYolrnd in the contest, a majority of the Colonies refused to permit their Delegates to sign the Declaration of Independence except
upon the distinct condition and e2..'press reservation to each colony
of the exclusiYe right to manage and control its local concerns and
police regulations without the intervention of any general Congress
which might be established for tbc United Colonies.
Let us cite one of these reservations as a specimen of all, showing
conclusiYely that they were fighting for the inalienable right of local
self-government, with tho clear understanding that when they h:id
succeeded in throwing off the despotism of the British Parliament,
no Congressional despotism was to be substituted for it:
"We, the Delegates of Maryland, in convention assembled, do declare that the
King of Great Britnin has violated his compact with this people, and that they owe
no allcgi:mce to him. We have there fore thought it just and necessary to empower
our Deputies in Congress to join with a majority of the United Colonies in declaring
them free and independent States, in framing such fnrtbcr coufcdcrntion between
them, in making forei&n alliances, and iu adopting such other measures ns shall be
judged necessary for the prescn·ation of their liberties :
"Provided, tho sole and cxclusiYc right of regulating the internal polity nnd government of this Colony be reserved to the people thereof.
"We have also thought proper to call a new convention for the purpose of establishing a. gol'ernment in this Colony.
"No ambitious views, no desire of independence, induced the people of i\Iaryland
t-0 form an union witli the otlier colonic.,. To procure 1111 exemption from Parliamentary ta..xation, and to continue to the Legislatw·es of these Colonies the sole and
exclusi,·e right of regulating their Internal P olity, was our original and only moti,,e.
To maintain inviolate our liberties, and to transmit them unimpaired to posterity,
was our duty and first wish ; our next, to continue connected with and dependent on
Great Britain. J,'or tl1e truth of these assertions we appeal to that Almighty Being
who is emphatically styled the Searcher of hearts, and from whose omniscience none
is concealed. Relying on his Divine protection nod a...ssistancc, and trusting to the
justice of our cause, we exhort and conjm·e every virtuous citizen to join cordially
in defense of onr common rights, and in maintcrumce of tho freedom of this and her
sister colonies.·•

The £rst Plan of Foclcral G_overnmont adopted for the United
States was formed during the Revolution, and is usually lmown as
"The Articles of Confederation." By these Articles it was provided
that "Each State retains its Sovereignty, Freedom, and lndepend-
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ence, and every power, jurisdiction, :md right which is not by this
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress
assembled."
.At the time the .Articles of Confederation were adopted-J uly 9,
1778-the United States bold no lands or territory in common. The
entire country-including all the waste and unappropriated landsembmcecl within or pertaining to tbo Confederacy, belonged to and
was the property of t he several States within whose limits the same
was situated.
On the 6th day of September, 1780, Congress "recommended to
the several States in tho Union having claims to waste and unappropriated lands in- the Western country, a liberal cession to tho
United States of a portion of their respective claims for the common
benefit of the Union."
On the 20th day of October, 1783, the Legislature ofVirginia passed :m act authorizing tbe Delegates in Congress from that State to
convey to the United States" the tenitory or tract of country within tbe limits of tbe Virginia Charter, lying and bearing to the northwest of the River Ohio"-which grant was to be made upon the
" condition that the territory so ceded shall be laid out :ind formed
into States;" and that "tho States so formed shall be distinct republican States, and admitted members of the Federal Union, banng the
same rights of Sovereignty, Freedom, and Independence as the other
States."
On tbe 1st day ofMarch, l '784, Thomas J efferson and bis colleagues
in Congress executed the deed of cession in 1rnrsuance of the act of
the Virginia L egislature, which was accepted and ordered to "be
recorded and enrolled among the acts of the United States in Congress assembled." T his was the first territory e,·er acquired, held,
or owned by tho United States. On the same day of the deed of
cession l\fr. J efferson, as chairman of a committee which had been
appointed, consisting of l\fr. J efferson ofVirginia, 1\lr. Chase ofMaryland, and Mr. H owell ofR hode Island, submitted to Congress" a plan
for tho temporary government of tho torritory ceded or to be ceded
by tho individual States to the United States."
I t is important that this Jeffersonian Plan of government for the
Territories should be carefully considered for many obvious reasons.
I t was the first plan of government for tho Territories ever adopted
iu the United States. I t was drawn by t he author of the Declara,.
tion of Independence, and revised and adopted by those who shaped
the issues which produced the ReYolution, and formed the foundations upon which our whole Americnn system of governments rests.
I t was not intended to be either local or temporary in its chru:acter,
but was designed to apply to all "territory ceded or to be ceded,"

..
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and to be universal in its application and eternal in its dmation,
wherever and whenever we might have territory requiring a go,ernment. I t ignored the right of Congress to legislate for the people
of the Territories without their consent, and recognizec1 the inalienable right of the people of the Territories, when organized into political communities, to govern themselves in respect to their local concerns and internal polity. It was adopted by the Congress of the
Confederation on the 23d day of April, 1784, and stood upon the
Statute Book as a general and permanent plan for the government
of all territory which we then owned or should subsequently acquire,
with a provision declaring it to be a" Charter ofCompact," and that
its provisions should " stand as fundamental conditions between the
thirteen original States and those newly described, unalterable but
by the joint consent of the United States in Congress assembled, and
of the particula.r State within which such alteration is proposed to •
be made." Thus this Jeffersonian Plan for the government of the
Territories-this "'Charter of Compact"-" these fundamental conditions," which were declared to be " unalterable" without the consent
of the people of" the particular State [territory] within which such
a1teration is proposed to be mac1e," stood on the Statute Book when
the Convention assembled at Philadelphia in I 7S'f and proceeded to
form the Constitution of the United States.
Now let us examine the main provisions of the Jeffersonian Plan :•
First.-" That the territory ceded or to be ceded by the individual States to the
United &ares, whenever the same shall have been purchased of the Indian inhabitants and offered ,for sale by the U nitcd States, shall be formed into additional
States," etc., etc.

The Plan proceeds to designate the boundaries and territorial extent of the propo~ed "additional States," and then provides:
Second.-" That the settlers within the territory so to bo purchased and offered
for sale shall, either on their own petition or on the order of Congress, receive authority from them, with appointments of time an.d place, for their free males of full
age to meet together for the purpose of establishing a temporary government to adopt
the Constitution and Jaws of any one of these States [the original States], so that
such laws nevertheless shall be subject to alteration by their ordinary Legislature; and
to erect, subject to like alteration, counties or townships for the election of members
for their Legislature."

Having thus provided a mode by which the first inhabitants or
settlers of the territory may assemble together and choose for themselves the Constitution and laws of some one of the original thirteen
States, and declare the same in force for the government of their territory temporarily, with the right on the part of the people to change
the same, through their local Legislature, as they may see proper,
the P lan then proceeds to point out the mode in which they may
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establish for themselves "a permanent Constitution and government,"
whenever they shall have twenty thousand inhabitants, as follows:
Third. -" That such temporary government only shall continue in force in any
until it shall have acquired twenty thousand free inhabitants, when, giving due
proof thereof to Congress, they shall receive from them authority, with appointments
of time and place, to call a Convention of Representatives to establish a permanent
Constitution and government for themselves."

S(ll.le

Having thus provided for the fu-st settlers "a temporary government" in these "additional States," and for "a pe1·manent Constitution and government" when they shall have acquired twenty thousand inhabitants, the Plan contemplates that they shall continue to
govern themselves as States, having, as provided in the Virginia deed
of cession, "the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence," in respect to their domestic affairs and internal polity," as the
other States," until they shall have a population equal to the least
numerous of the original thirteen States ; and in the mean time shall
keep a sitting member in Congress, with a right of debating but not
of voting, when they shall be admitted into the Union on an equal
footing with the other States, as follows :
Fourth.-" That whenever any of the said States shall have offree inhabitants as
many as shall then be in any one of the least numerous of the thirteen original St.ates,
such State shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United States
on an equal footing wit-h the said original States." . . •.

.And-

,, Until such admission by their delegates into Congress any of the said States,
after the establishment of their temporary government, shnll have authority to keep
a sitting member in Congress, with the right of debating, but not of voting."

Attached to the provision which appears in this paper under the
"thircl" head is a proviso, containing five propositions, which, when
agreed to and accepted by the 1,eople of said additional States, were
to "be formed into a charter of compact," and to remain forever
" unalterable," except by the consent of such States as well as of the
United States-to wit :
"Provided.that both the tempprary and permanent governments be established on
these principles as their basis :"
1st.-" '!'hat they shall forever remain a part of the United States of America."
2d.- "That in their persons, property, and tetTitory they shall be subject to the
government of the Unit~d States in Congress assembled, and to the Articles of Confederation in all those cases in which the original States shall be so subject."
8d.-" '!'hat they shall be subject to pay a patt of the federal debts contracted, or
to be contracted-to be apportioned on them by Congress according to the same com·
mon mle and measure by which apportionments thereof shall be made on the other
States."
4th.-" That their respective governments shall be in republican form, and shall
admit no person to be a citizen who holds any hereditary title."

T he fifth article, which relates to the prohibition of slavery after
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the year 1800, haring been 1·ejected by Congress, never became.a
part of the J etrersonian Plan of GoYernment for the Territories, as
adopted .April 23, 1784.
Tho concluding paragraph of tllis Plan of Government, which emphatically ignores the right of Congress to bind the people of the
•rerritories without their consent, and recognizes the people therein
as the true source of all lcgitiniate power in respect to their intemal
polity, is in these words:
" Thnt nil the preceding articles shnll be formed into a charter <if compact, shnll be
duly executed by tho President of the United States, in Congress nssembled, under
his hnnd and tho sen! of tho United States, shall be promulgated, and shall stand as
fundnmcntnl conditions between the thirteen originnl Stntcs ond those newly described, unnlterablo but by tho joint consent of the United States in Congress assembled, and of the pnrticular Stnte within which such altcrntiou is propo..<cd to be made."

This J etfersonian Plan of Government embodies ancl carries out
the ideas and principles of the fathers of tho Revolution-that the
people of every separate political community (dependent colonies,
Provinces, and Territories as well as sovereign States) ha,e an inalienable right to govern themselves in respect to theil' internal polity,
and repudiates the dogma of the British Ministry and the Tories of
that day that :ill colonies, Provinces, and Territories were the property of the Empire, acquired with the common blood and common
treasure, and that the inhabitants thereof have no rights, privileges,
or immunities except such as the Imperial government should graciously condescend to bestow upon them. This Plan recognizes by
law ancl irrevocable "compact" tbc eA'istencc of two distinct clnsses
of Stat.es under our American system of government-the one being
members of the Union, and consisting of the original thil'teen and
such other States, haring the requisite popnlation, as Congress shonld
:,-idmit into the Federal Union, with an equal vote in tho management
of Federal affuil"s as well as the exclusive power in 1·ogard to their
i11tcrnal polity respectively-the other, not having the requisite population for admission into the Union, could have no vote or agency
in the control of the Federal relations, but possessed the same exclusive power over theil" domestic affairs and internal policy respecti,ely as the original States, with the right, while they have less than
twenty thousand inhabitants, to choose for their government the
Constitution and laws of any one of the original States ; and when
they should have more than twenty thousand, but less than tho number required to entitle them to admission into the Union, they were
authorized to form for themselves "a permanent Constitution and
government;" and in either case they were entitled to keep a delegate in Congress with the right ofdebating, but not of voting. This
"Ch::irter of Compact," with its "fundamental conditions," which
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were declared to be "unalterable" without" the joint consent" ofthe
people interested in them, as well as of the United States, thus stood
on the statute book unrepealed and irre1lealable-furnishing a complete systom of government for all "the territory ceded or to be
ceded" to the United States, without any other legislation upon the
subject, when, on the 14th day of May, 1787, the Federal Convention
assembled in Philadelphia and proceeded to form the Const-itution
under which we now live. Thus it will be seen that the dividing
line between Federal and Local authority, in respect to the rights of
those political communities which, for the sake of convenience and in
contraclistinction to the States represented in Congress, we now call
Territories, but which were then known as" States," or "new States,"
was so distinctly marked at that day that no intelligent man could
fail to perceive it.
It is true that the government of the Confederation had proved
totally inadequate to the fulfillment of the ends for which it was devised ; not because of the relations between the Territories, or new
States, and the United States, but in consequence of having no power
to enforce its decrees on the Federal questions which were clearly
within the scope of its expressly delegated powers. The radical defects in the Articles of Confederation were fotmd to consist in the
fact that it was a mere league between sovereign States, and not a
Federal Government with its appropriate departments-Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial-each clothed with authority to peiform
and carry into effect its own peculiar functions. The Confederation
having no power to enforce compliance with its resolves, "the consequence was, that though in theory the Resolutions of Congress were
equivalent to laws, yet in practice they were found to be mere recommendations, which the States, like other sovereignties, observed or
disregarded according to their own good-will and gracious pleasure."
Congress could not impose duties, collect taxes, raise armies, or clo
:my other act essential to the existence of government, without the
voluntary consent and co-operation of each of the States. Congress
could resolve, but could not carry its resolutions into effect--could
recommend to the States to provide a revenue for the necessities of
the Federal Government, but could not use the means necessary t o
the collection of the revenue when the States failed to comply- could
recommend to the States to provide an army for the general defense,
and apportion among the States their respective quotas, but could
not enlist the men and order them into the· Federal service. For
these reasons a Federal Government, ,vith its appropriate depart,.
ments, acting directly upon the individual citizens, with authority to
enforce its decrees to the extent of its delegated powers, and not dependent upon the voluntary action of the several States in their cor-
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porate capacity, became indispensable as a substitute for the g9v,ernmcnt of the Confederation.
In the formation of the Constitution ofthe United States the Federal
Convention took the British Constitution, as interpreted and expounded by the Colonies during their controversy with Great Britain,
for their model-making such modifications in its structure and principles as the change in our condition had rendered necessary. They
intrusted the Executive functions to a President in the place of a
King; the Legislative functions to a Congress composed of a Senate
and House of Representatives, in lieu of the Parliament consisting of
the Houses of Lords and Commons ; . and the Judicial functions to a
Supreme Court and such inferior Courts as Congress should froin
time to time ordain and establish.
Having thus divided the powers of government into the three
appropriate departments, with which they had always 1:ieen familiar,
they proceeded to confer upon the Federal Government substantially
the same powers which they as colonies had been willing to concede
to the British Government, and to reserve to the States and to the
people the same rights and privileges which they as colonies had
denied to the British Government dm·ing the entire struggle which
terminated in our Independence, and which they had ciaimed for
themselves and their posterity as the birth-right of all freemen,
inalienable when organized into political communities, and to be
enjoyed and exercised by Colonies, Territories, and Provinces as
fully and completely as by sovereign States. Thus it will be seen
that there is no organic feature or fundamental principle embodied in
the Constitution of the United States which had not been familiar to
the people of the Colonies from the period of their earliest settlement, and which had not been repeatedly asserted by them when
denied by Great Britain dm-ing the whole period of their colonial
history.
Let us pause at this point for a moment, and inquire whether it be
just to those illustrious patriots and sages who formed the Constitution of the United States, to assume that they intended to confer
upon Congress that unlimited and arbitrary power over the people
of the American Territories, which theyhad resisted with their blood
when claimed by the British Parliament over BritisJ:i colonies in
, .Amei-ica? Did they confer upon Congress the right to bind the
people of the .American Territories in all cases whatsoever, after
having fought the battles of the Revolution against a " Preamble"
declaring the right of Parliament " to bind the Colonies in all cases
whatsoever?"
If, as they contended before the Revolution, it was the birth-right
of all Englishmen, inalienable when formed into political commnni-
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ties, to exercise exclusive power of legislation in their local legislatures in respect to all things affecting their internal polity-slavery
not excepted-did not- tho same right, after the Revolution, and by
virtue of it, become the bi.rth-1·ight of all Americans, in like manner
inalienable when organized into political communities-no matter by
what name, whether Colonies, Territories, Provinces, or new States?
Names often deceive persons in respect to tho nature and substance of things. A signal instance of this kind is to be found in that
clause of the Constitution which says:
" Congress shall liave power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the ten-itory or other property belonging to the United States."

This being the only clause of the Constitution in which the word
" territory" appears, that fact alone has doubtless led many persons
to suppose that the right of Congress to establish temporary governments for the Territories, in the sense in which the word is now
used, must be derived from it, overlooking the inlportant ancl controlling facts that at the tinlo the Constitution was formed tho word
"territory" had never been used or understood to designate a political community or government of any kind in rtny law, compact, deed
of cession, or public document ; bnt hacl invariably been used either
in its geographical sense to describe the superficial area of a State or
district of country, as in tho Virginia deed of cession of the" territory
or tract of country" northwest of the River Ohio ; or as meaning
laud in its character as property, in which latter sense it avpears in
the clause of tho Constitution referred to, when provicliug for the
disposition of the "territory or other property belonging to the
United States." These facts, tnkeu in connection with the kindred
one that during the whole period of the Confederation and the formation of the Constitution the temporary governments which we now
call " Territories," ·were invariably referred to in tlle deeds of ces~ion,
laws, compacts, plans of government, resolutions of Congress, public
records, and authentic documents as "States," or "new States," conclusively show that the words "territory and other property" in the
Constitution were used to designate the unappropriated lands and
other property which the United States owned, and not the J)eople
who might become residents on those lands, and be organized into political communities after the United States had parted with their title.
It is from this clause of the Constitution alone that Congress derives the power to provide for the surveys ancl sale of the public
lands and all other property belonging to the United States, not only
in the Territories, but also in the several States of the Union. But
for tl1is provision Congress would have no power to authorize the
sale of the public lauds, military sites, old ships, cannon, muskets, or
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other property, real or personal, which belong to the United States
and are no longer needed for any public purpose. It refers exclusively to property in contradistinction to persons and communities.
I t confers tho same power "to make all needful rules and regulations" in tho States as in the Territories, and extends wherever there
may be any land or other property belonging to the United St:ites to
be regubted or disposed of; but does not authorize Congress to
control or interfere ·with the domestic institutions and internal polity
of the people (either in the States or the T erritories) who may reside
upon lands which the United States once owned. Such a power, had
it been ,ested in Congress, would annihilate the sovereignty ancl
freedom of the States as well as tho great principle of self.government
in the Territories, whero,er the United States happen to own a portion of the public bnds within their respective limit!!, as, at present,
in the States of Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas,
Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, :Minnesota, California, ancl Oregon, and in the T erritories of Washington,
Nebraska, Kansas, Utah, and New Mexico. Tho idea is repugnant
to the spirit and genius of our complex system of go,ernment ; because it effectually blots out the dividing line between Federal and
Local authority which forms an essential barrier for the defense of
the independence of tho States ancl the liberties of tho people against
Fedoml invasion. With one anomalous exception, all the powers
confe1Ted on Congress areFederal, and not M unicipal, in their character-affocting the general welfare of the whole country without
interfering with tho intemal polity of tho people-and can be carried
into effect by laws which apply alike to States and Territories. Tho
exception, being in derogation of one of tho fundamental principles
of om· political system (because it authorizes the Federal Government
to control the mtmicipal affairs and internal polity of tho people in
cermin specified, limited localities), was not left to v:iguo inference
or loose constrnction, nor expressed in dubious or equi,ocal language;
but is found plainly written in that Section of tho Constitution which
says :
"Congres.s sbnll hn,o power to cxerciso exclusive legislation in all cnses wbatsoe,er, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) ns may, by cc...,;ion of pru-ticulnr States, nnd the ncccptnncc of Congress, become the scat of the govemlllcnt of
tho United States, nod to exerci,o like authority o,cr all places purchased by the
consent of the Legislature of the Stnoo in which the same shnll be, for the erection
of forts, mngnzines, arsennL-, dock-yards, and other needfnl buildings."

No such power" to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever," nor indeed any legislation in any case whatsoever, is conferred on Congress in respect to the municipal affairs and internal
polity, either of the States or of the Territories. On tho contr31:·,
after the Oonstitution bad been finally adopted, with its Federal
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powers delegated, enumerated, and defined, in order to guard in all
future time against any possible infringement of the reserved rights
of the States, or of the -l)eople, an amendment was incorporated into
the Constitution which marks the dividing line bet'ween Federal and
Local autho1•ity so directly and indelibly that no lapse of time, no
partisan prejudice, no sectional aggrandizement, no frenzied fanaticism can efface it. The amendment is in these words :
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibit.eel by it to the Stat.es, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

This view of the subject is confirmed, if indeecl any corroborative
evidence is required, by reference to the proceedings and debates of
the Federal Convention, as reported by Mr. Madison. On the 18th
of .August, after a series of resolutions had been adopted as the basis
of the proposed Constitution and referred to the Committee of Detail foi· the 1mrpose of being put in proper form, the record says :

"?.Ir. Madison submitted, in order to be referred to the Committee of Detail, the
following powers, as propc1· to be added to those of the general Logislaturo (Congr~ss) :
"To dispose of the unappropriated lands of the United States.
"To institute temporary governments for the new States arising thereiu.
" To regulate affairs with the Indians, as well within as without the limits of the
United States.
"To exercise exclusively lcgislati,,c authority nt the seat of the general government, and over a disti·ict around the same not exceeding - - square miles, t.he consent of the Logislature of the State or States comprising the same being fu-st obtained. "

Herc we find the original and rough draft of these several powers
as they now exist, in their. revised form, in the Constitution. The
provision empowering Congress "to dispose of the unappropriated
lands of the United States" was modifiecl and enlargecl so as to include "other property belonging to the United States," and to
authorize Congress to " make all 'neeclful rules and regulations" for
the preservation, management, and sale of the same.
The provision empowering Congress "to institute temporary governments for the new States arising in tho unappropriated lands of the
United States," taken in connection with the one empowering Congress "to exercise exclusively Legislative authority at the seat of the
general government, and over a clistrict of country around the same,"
clearly shows the difference in the extent and nature of the powers
intended to be confened in the new States or Territories on the one
hand, and in the District of Columbia on the other. In the one case
it was proposed to authorize Congress "to institute temporary governments for the new States," or Territories, as they are now called,
just as our Revolutionary fathers recognized the i-ight of the British
crown to institute · local governments for the Colonies, by issuing
charters, under which the people of the Colonies were "entitled
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(according to the Bill of Rights acloptecl by the Continental Congress) to a free ancl exclusive power of legislation, in their several
Provincial Legislatures, where their right of representation can alone
be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal polity;" while, in
the other case, it was proposed to authorize Congress to exercise,
exclusively, legislative authority over the municipal ancl internal
polity of the people residing' within the district which should be
ceded for that purpose as the seat of the general government.
Each of these provisions was moclified and perfected by the Committees of Detail and Revision, as will appear by comparing them
with the corresponding clauses as finally incorporated into the Constitution. The provision to authorize Congress to institute temporary
governments for the new States or Territories, and to provide for
their admission into the Union, appears in the Constitution in this
form :
'' N cw States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union."

Tbe power to admit "new States," and " to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper" to that end, may fairly be construed
to include the right to institute temporary governments for such new
States or Territories, the same as Great Britain could rightfully
institute similar governments for the Colonies; but certainly not to
authorize Congress to legislate in respect to their municipal affairs
and internal concerns, without violating that great fundamental
principle in defense of which the battles of the Revolution were
fought.
_
If judicial authority were deemed necessary to give force to principles so eminently just in themselves, and which form the basis of
our entire political system, such authority may be found in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Dred Scott
case. In that case the Comi; say :

+

"This brings us t-0 c1<amine by ,~hat pro,ision of tbe Constitution the present Federal Government, under its delegated and restricted powers, is authorized to acquire
territory outside of the original limits of the United States, and what powers it may
exercise therein over the person or property of a citizen of the United States, while
it remains a Tenitory, and until, it shall be admitted as one of the States of the
Union.
"There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies, bordering on the United States or at a distance, to be rnled and governed at its own pleasure; nor to enlarge its territorial
liinits in any way except by the admission of new States . . .
"'.rhe power to e:xpand the territory of the United States by the admission of new
States is plainly given; and in the construction of this power by all the departments
of the Government, it has been held to authorize the acquisition of territory, not fit
for admission at the time, but to be admitted as soon as its population and situation
would entitle it to admission. It is acqufrcd to become a State, and not to be bcld
as a colony and governed by Congi-ess with absolute authority; and as the propriety
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of admitting a new State is committed to the sound discretion of Congress, the power
to acquire territory for that purpose, to be held by the United States unt,il it is in a
suitable condition to become a State upon an equal footing with the other States,
must rest upon tho srune discretion."

H aving determined the question that the power to acquire territory for the purpose of enlarging our territorial limits and increasing
the number of States is included within the power to admit new
Stat,es and conferred by the same clause of the Constitution, the
Court proceed to say that "the power to acquire necessarily carries
with it the power to preserve and apply to the purposes for which it
was acquired." And again, referring to a former decision <if the
same Court in respect to the power of Congress to institute governments for the Territories, the Court say :
"The power stands firmly on the latter alternative put by the Court- that is, as
• the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory.'"

The power to acquire territory, as well as the right, in the language
of l\fr. Madison, "to institute temporary governments for the new
States arising therein" (or Territorial governments, as they m•e now
called), having been traced to that provision of the Constitution
which provides for the admission of "new States," the Court proceed
to consider the nature and extent of the power of Congress over the
people of the Territories:
" All we mean to say on this point is, that, 11S there is no express reg~ation in t.h e
Constitution defining the power which the general government may exercise over
the person or property of a citizen in a Territory thus acquired, the Court must nee•
essarily look to the provisions and principles of the Constitution, and its distribution
of powers, for the mies and principles by which its decision must be governed.
"Taking this rule to guide us, it may be safely assumed that citizens of the United
States, who emigrate to a Territory belonging to the people of the United States, can
not be rnlcd as mere colonists, dependent upon the will of the general government,
and to be governed by any laws it may think proper to impose . . . The Te1Titory
being a part of the United States, the Government and the citizen both enter it under the authority of the Constitution, with their respective rights defined and marked
out; and the Federal Govemment can exercise no power over his person or property
beyond what that instrument confers, nor lawfully deny any right which it has reserved."

Hence, inasmuch as the Constitution has conferred on the Feder7 - Government no right to interfere with the property, domestic rela:
tions, police regulations, or internal polity of the people of the Territories, it necessarily follows, under the authority of the Court, that
Congress can rightfully exercise no such power over the people of
the Tenitories. For this reason alone, the Supreme Court were
authorized and compelled to pronounce the eighth section of the Act
approved March 6, 1820 (commonly called the Missouri Compromise),
inoperative and void-there being no power delegated to Congress
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in the Constitution authorizing Congress to prohibit slavery in the
T erritories.
In the course of tho discussion of this question the.Court gave an
elaborate exposition of the structure, principles, and powers of the
Federal Government; showing th.i.t it possesses no powers except
tl1ose which are delegttted, enumerated, and defined in the Constitution ; and that all othe1· powers are either prohibited altogether or
are 9•eserved to the States, or to the people. In order to show that
the prohibited, as well as the delegated powers are enumerated and
defined in the Constitution, the Court enumerated certain JlOwers
wh1ch can not be exercised eithe1· by Congress or by the Territorial
Legislatures, or by any other authority whatever, for the simple
reason that they are forbidden by the Constitution.
Some persons who have not examined critically tho opinion of the
Court in this respect have been induced to believe that the slavery
question was included in this class of prohibited powers, and that
the Court had decided in tho Dred Scott C/\Se that the Territorial
L egislature could not legislate in respect to slave property the same
as all other property in the Territories. A few extracts from the
opinion of the Court will correct this error, and show clearly the
class of powers to which the Court referred, as being forbidden alike
to the F ederal Government, to the States, ancl to the Territories.
T ho Court sny:

"A reference to a few of the pro,·isions of the Constitution will illustrate this proposition. For example, no one, we pre,ume, will contend that Congress can make
:my law in a T erritory respecting the establishment of religion, or the free exercise
thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the J>ress, or the right of the people
of the Territory pcnccnbly to assemble, nod to petition the Go,· crumeot for the redress of grie,·anccs.
"Nor can Congress deny to the people the right to keep nnd benr nrms, nor the
right to trial by jury, nor compel nny one to be a witness against hlmsclf in a criminal proceeding . . . So too, it will hardly be contended that Congress could by law
quarter n soldier in n house in a Territory without the consent of the owner in n
time of pence; nor in time of war but in n manner prescribed by law. Nor could
they by law forfeit the property of a citizen in n Territory who was comicted of treason, foi· n longer period than the life of the person convicted, nor take prh•nte property for public use without just compensation.
\_.... '' The powers over persons nod property, of which we speak, nre not only not granted to Congress, but are in express terms denied, and they are forbidden to exercise
them. And this prohibition is not confined to the States, but the words are general,
nod extend to the whole territory over which the Constitution gives it power to legislate, including those portions of it remaining under T erritorial governments, ns well
as that cO\·ered by States.
"It is II total absence of power, every where within the dominion of the United
~tntcs, nruiplaccs fhe citizens of n Territory, so7ai" ns thcscrights arecoii;ernco,on
t'l!l! Mme footing with ~itizens otthe Stttt~, anagunrds them as firmly and plninly
·against any inroad,; which the general go,·emmentmigbt attempt, umler The pTcn. of
implied orincidcnt:lfpowersi -And if Congress itself can not do this-if it is beyond
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the powers conferred on the Federal Government,-it will be admitted, we presume,
that. it conlcl not authorize a Territorial government to exercise them. It could confer no power on any local government, established by its authority, to violate the provisions of the Constitution."

Nothing can be more certain than that the Court were here speaking only of forbidden powers, which were denied alike to Congress,
tCJ the State Legislatures, and to the Territorial Legislatm·es, and
that the prohibition extends " every where within the dominion of
the United States," applicable equally to States and Territories, as
well as to the United States.
If this sweeping prohibition- this just but inexorable restriction
upon the powers of Government-Federal, State, and Territorialshall ever be held to include the slavery question, thus negativing
the right of the people of the States and 'l'erritorics, as well as the
Federal Government, to control it by law (and it will be observed
that in the opinion of the Court "the citizens of a Territory, so far
as these rights aJ-'e concerned, are on the same footing with the citizens of the States"), then, indeed, will the doctrine become firmly
established that the principles of law applicable to .African slavery
are imif01·mAth1'0uglwut the domini01i of the United States, and that
there "is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring
forces, which means that the United States must and will, sooner or
fater, become either entirely a slaveholding nation or entirely a freelabor nation."
Notwithstanding the disa-strous consequences which would inevitably result from the authoritative recognition and practical operation of such a doctrine, there are those who maintain that the- Comt
referred to and included the slavery question within that class of
forbidden powers which (although the same in the Territories as in
the States) could not be exercised by the people of the Territories.
If this proposition were true, which fortt1Dately for the peace and
welfare of the whole country it is not, the conclusion would inevitably result, which they logically decluce from the premises-that the
Constitution by the recognition of slavery establishes it in the Terrjtories beyond the power of the people to control it by law, and guarantees to every citizen the right to go there and be protected in the
enjoyment of his slave property ; and when all other remedies fail
for the protection of such rights of property, it becomes the imperative duty of Congress (to the pe1formance of which every member is
bound by his conscience and his oath, and from which no consideration of political policy or expediency can release him) to provide by
law such adequate ancl complete protection as is essential to the foll
enjoyment of au important right secured by the Constitution. If the
proposition be true, that the Constitution establishes slavery in the
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Territories beyond the power of the people legally to control it,
another result, no less startling, and from which there is no escape,
must inevitably follow. The Constitution is uniform "every where
within the dominions of the United St.'ltes"-is the same in Pennsylvani:i. as in Kansas-and if it be true, as stnted by the President in a
speci:ll Message to Congress, " that slavery exists in Kansas by virtue of the Constitution of the United States," and that "Kansas is
therefore at this moment as much a slave State as Georgia or South
Carolina," why docs it not exist in Pennsylvania by virtue of the
same Constitution ?
If it be said that P ennsylvania is a Sovereign State, and therefore
has a right to regulnte tho slavery question within her own limits to
suit herself, it must lie borne in mind that the sovereignty of Pennsylvania, like that of every other State, is limited by the Constitution,
which provides that:
"This Constitution, oml oil lows of the United Stotcs which sl1nll be mode in pursuance thereof, nnd all treaties mndc, or which shall be mndc, under the authority of
tho United States, shall be the supreme /,aw ofthe land, and the judges in every State
shnll be bound thereby, m19 tlii119 in tlie C',mstitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

Ilence, the State of Pennsylrnnia, with her Constitution and laws,
and domestic institutions, and internal policy, is subordinate to the
Constitution of the United States, in the same manne1·, and to the
samo extent, as the T erritory of Kansas. The Kansas-Nebraska Act
says that tho Territory of Kansas shall exercise legisl:ttivo power
ove1· "all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution," and that the people of said Territory shall be left "perfectly
free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in theh- own
way, subject only to the Constitution of tbo United States." The
provisions of this .Act are believed to be in entire harmony with the
Constitution, and under them the people of Kansas possess every
right, priv:ilcge, and immunity, in respect to their internal polity and
domestic relations which the people of Pennsylvania can exercise
under their Constitution and laws. Each is invested ·with full, complete, and exclusive powers in this respect, "subject only to the Constitution of the United States."
The question recurs thel!, if the Constitution does establish sla,ery
in Kansas or any other Territory beyonc1 the power of the people to
control it by law, how can the conclusion be resisted that slavery is
established in like manner and by the same authority in all the States
of the Union? And if it be the imperative duty of Congress to provide by lnw for tho protection of slave property '1n the Territories
upon the ground that" sLwery exists in Kansas" (and consequently
in every other Territory), "by virtue ofthe Constitution oftheUnited
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States," why is it not also the duty of Congress, for the same reason,
to provide similar protection to slave pr0perty in all the States of the
Union, when the Legislatures fail to furnish such protection?
Without confessing or attempting to avoid tlte inevitable consequences of their own doctrine, its advocates endeavor to fortify their
position by citing the Dred Scott decision to prove that the Constitution recognizes property in slaves-that there is no legal distinction
between this and every other description of property-that slave
property and every other kind of property stand on an equal footiog- tbat Congress bas no more power over the one than over the
crther.:.-and, consequently, can not discriminate between them.
Upon this poiot the Court say:
"Now as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different
point., the right of property in a slave is distinctly and e>.l)ressly atfuwed in the Constitution . . . . And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the master
in a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property and other
property owned by a citizen, no tribunal acting under the authority of the United
States, whether it bo legislative, executive, or judicial, has a right t0 draw such a
distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the provisions and guarnntees which have
been provided for the protection of private property against the encroachments of the
government .. .. And the government in express terms is pledged to protect it in
all foture time, if the slave escapes fi·om his owner. This is done in plaiu words-too
plain to be misunderstood. And no word can be found in the Constitution which
gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles property of that
kind to le.ss protection thnn property ofany other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with ·the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in
his rights."

-><-

The rights of the owner which it is thus made the duty of the Federal Government to guard and protect are those expressly provided
for in the Constitution, and defined in clear and explicit language by
the Court-that "the government, io express terms, is pledged to
protect it (slave property) io all futme time, if the sl,ave escapes from
liis owner." This is the only contingency, according to the plain
reading of the Constitution as authoritatively interpreted by the
Supreme Court, in which the Federal Government is authorized, required, or permitted to interfere with slavery in the States or 'rerritorics; and in that case only for the purpose " of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights" to reclaim his slave property. In all
other respects slaves stand on the same footing with all other property-" the Constitution makes no distinction between that description of property and other property owned by a citizen;" and "no
word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a
greater power over slave property, or which entitles property of that
kind to less protection than property of any other description." This
is the basis upon which all rights pertaining to slave property, either
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in tho States or the Territories, st:md under the Constitution as expounded by tho Supremo Comt in the Dred Scott case.
Inasmuch as the Constitution has delegated no power to the Federal Government in respect to any other kind of property belonging
to tho citizen-neither introducing, establishing, prohibiting, nor excluding it any where within the dominion of the United States, but
leaves tho owner thereof pe1fectly free to remove into any State or
Territory and _carry his property with him, and bold the same subject to the local law, and relying upon the local authorities for protection, it follows, according to tho decision of the Comt, that slave
property stands on the samo footing, is entitled to the same rights
and immunities, and in like manner is dependent upon the local authorities and laws for protection.
The Court refer to that clause of the Constitution which proYides
for the rendition of fugitive slaves as their authority fo1· saying that
"the right of property in slaves is distinctly and expressly affim1ed
in the Constitution." By reference to that provision it will be seen
that, while the word " slaves" is not used, still the Constitution not
only recognizes the rigl1t of property in slaves, as stated by the
Court, but e:Kplicitly states what class of persons shall be deemed
i-laves, and under what laws or authority they may be held to servitude, and under what circumstances fogith·e slaves shall be restored
to their owners, all in the same section, as follows :
"No person held to scn;ce or labor in one State, ttnder tlte laws tltereof, eseaping
into another, shall, in coru;cqncnce of any lo.w or regulation therein, be discharged
from snch scnicc or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom
such scn,ice or labor may be due."

Thns it will be seen that a slave, within the meaning of the Constitution, is a" person held to senice or labor in one State, under tile
laws tliei·eo.f''-not under the Constitution of the United States, nor
by the Jaws thereof, nor by virtue of any Federal authority whatsoever, but under the laws of the particular State where snch service
or labor may be due.
I t was necessaq to givo this exact definition of slavery in the Constitution in order to satisfy the people of the South as well as of the
North. T ho sl:webolding States would never consent for a moment
that their domestic relations-and especially their right of pro1)erty
in their slaves-should be dependent upon F ederal authority, or that
Congress should have any power over the subject-either to extend,
confu1e, or restrain it; much less to protect or regulate it-lost, under
the pretense of protection and regulation, the Federal Government,
under the influence of the strong and increasing anti-slavery sentiment which prevailed at that period, might destroy the institution,
and diYest those rights of property in slaves which -were sacred un-
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der the laws and constitutions of their respective States so long as
the Federal Government had no power to interfere with the subject.
In like manner the non-slaveholding States, while they were entirely willing to provide for the suxrender of all fugitive slaves-as is
conclusively shown by the unanimous vote of all the States in the
Convention for the provision now under consideration-and to leave
each State perfectly free to hold slaves under its own laws, and by
virtue of its own separate and exclusive authority, so long as it
pleased, and to abolish it when it chose, were unwilling to become
responsible for its existence by incorporating it into the Constitution
as a national institution, to be protected and regulated, extended and
controlled by Federal authority, regard.less of the wishes of the pe0ple, and in defiance of the local laws of the several States and Territories. For these opposite reasons the Southern and Northern States
united in giving a unanimous vote in the Convention for that provision
of the Constitution which recognizes slavery as a local institution in
the several States where it exists, "tmder the laws thereof," and pr0vide,s for the surrender of fugitive slaves.
It will be observed that the term "State" is used in this provision,
as well as in various other parts of the Constitution, in the same sense
in which it was used by Mr. J eiferson in his plan for establishing governments for the new States in the territory ceded and to be ceded
to the United States, and by Mr. Madison in his proposition to confer
on Congress power " to institute temporary governments for the new
States arising in the unappropriated lands of the United States," to
designate the political communities, Territories as well as States,
within the dominion of the United States. The word "States" is
used in the same sense in the otdinancc of the 13th July, 1787, for
the government of the territory northwest of the River Ohio, which
was passed by the remnant of the Congress of the Confederation,
sitting in New York while its most eminent members were at Philadelphia, as delegates to the Federal Convention, aiding in the formation of the Constitution of the United States.
In this sense the word " States" is used in the clause providing for
the rendition of fugitive slaves, applicable to all political communities
under the authority of the United States, including the 'l'erritories ifs
well as the several States of the Union. Under any other constrnction the right of the owner to recoyer his slave would be restricted
to the States of the Union, leaving the Territories a secure place of
refuge for all fugitives. The same remark is applicable to the clause
of the Constitution which provides that "a person cbargecl in any
State ·with treason, felony, or other crime, wh!) shall flee from justice,
ancl be fotmd in another State, shall, on the d~mand of the executive
authority of the State from which be fled, be delivered up to be re-
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moved to the State having jurisdiction of tho crime." Unless the
term State, as used in these provisions of the Constitution, shall be
construed to include every distinct political community under the
jurisdiction of the United States, and to apply to Territories as well
as to the States of the Union, the Territories must become a sanctuary for all the fugitives from service ancl justice, for all the felons and
criminals who shall escape from the several States and seek refuge
and immunity in the Territo?"ies.
If any other illustration were necessary to show that the political
communities which we now call Territories (but which, during the
whole period of the Confederation and the formation of the Constitution, were ahrnys referred to as "States" or "new States"), are recognized as "States1' in some of the provisions of the Constitution,
they mny be folwd in those clauses whicl!_ declare that "no Stat<!'
shall enter into any "treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters
of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any
thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass
any bill of attainder, c:i: post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility."
It mnst be bomo in mind thnt in each of these cases where the
pow·er is not expressly delegated to Congress the prohibition is not
imposed upon tho Federal Government, but upon tho States. There
was no necessity for any such prohibition upon Congress or the Federal Government, for tho r eason that the omission to delegate any
such powers in the Constitution was of itself a prohibition, and so
declared in express terms by the 10th amendment, which declares
that" the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, arc reserved to the States
respecth·ely, or to tho })eople."
llenco it would cort..'llllly be competent for the States and Territories to exercise these powers but for tho prohibition contained in
those provisions ofthe Constitution; and inasmuch as the prohibition
only extends to the" States," the people ofthe" Territories" are still
at liberty to exercise them, unless the Territories arc included within
t,ho term States, within tho meaning of these provisions of the Constitution of the United States.
It only remains to be shown that the Compromise Measures of
1850 and tho Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 are in pe1feet harmony
with, and a faithful embodiment of tho principles herein enforced. A
brief history oftbcsc measures will disclose the principles upon which
they arc founded.
On the 29th of January, 1850, ]Ul:. Clay introduced into the Senate
a series of resolutions upon the slavery question which were intended
to form the basis of the subsequent legislation upon that subject.
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P ending the discussion of these resolutions the chairman of the Committee on Territories prepared and 1·eported to the Senate, on the
25th of March, two bills-one for the aclmission of California into the
Union of States, and the other for the org:miza.tion of the Territories
of Utah and New Mexico, and for the adjustment of the disputed
boundary with the State of Texas, which were read twice and printed
for the use of the Senate. On the 19th of April a select committee
of thirteen was appointed, on motion of }Ir. Foote, of Mississippi, of
which l\fr. Clay was macle cha:h-01ao, and to which were referred all
pending propositions relating to the shwery question. On the 8th
of May, Mr. Clay, from the select committee of thirteen, submitted to
the Senate an elaborate report covering all the points in controversy,
accompanied by a bill, which is usually known as tho" Omnibus Bill."
By reference to the provisions of this bill, as it appears on the files
of the Senate, it will be seen that it is composed of the two printed
bills which had been reported by tho Committee on Tenitories on
the 25th of March previous ; and that tho only material change in its
provisions, involving an important and essential principle, is to be
found in the tenth section, which prescribes and defines the powers
of the T erritorial Legislatme. In the bill, as reported by the Committee on TeITitories, the legislative power ofthe Territories 0::1.-tendcd
to " all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution oftbe United States," withottt excepting African Slavery,· while
the bill, as reported by the committee of thirteen, conferred the s.,me
power on the Territorial Legislatm·e, witli tlie ~ception of .African
Slavery. This portion of the section in its original form read thus:
"And be it further enacted thnt tho lcgislath-o power of the Territory shnll extend
to all l'ightful subjects of Jcgislntion consistent with the Constitution of the United
States and tho provisions of this net; but no law shnll be passed interfering with Ilic
primnry disposition of the soil."

T o which tho committee of thirteen added these words: "1.Vor in
When the bill came up for aciion on
the 15th of Ma.y, Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, said :

respect to .Afi·ican slavery."

"I offer the following amendment. To strike out, in tho sixth line of the tenth
section, the words 'in respect to .Africa,1 sl,avery,' and insert the worcls 'ioitl, tl,ose
rig/its ofproperty _qrowing 01,t of tl1e institution of.AJi-ican slai:ery as it erists in any of
tlie States of the Union.' The object of the amendment is to prevent the Territorinl
Legislature from legislating against the rights of property growing out of the institution of slavery. . . . . . It will leave to the Territorial Legislatures those rights
and powers which arc essentially necessary, not only to the preservation of property,
but to the peace of the Territory. I t will lca,e the right to make such police regulations as are necessary to pre,•cnt disorder, and which will bo absolutely necessary
with such property ns that to secure its beneficial use to its owner. With this brief
explanation I submit the amendment."

Mr. Clay, in reply to :Mr. Davis, said :

" I nm not perfectly sure that I comprehend tho full meaning of the amendment

3-i

POPULAR SOV:EREIGNTY IN THE TERRITORms.

offered by the Senator from Mississippi. I f I do, I think he accomplishes nothing by
striking out the clause now in the bill nnd inserting that which be proposes to insert.
T he clause now in the bill is, that the T erritorial legislation shall not c:i.."tCnd to any
thing respecting African slavery within the Territory. The effect of retaining the
clause as reported by the Committee will be this: That if in any of the Tenitories
sla,·ery now exists, it shall not be abolished by the Territorial Legislature; and if in
any of the Territ0rics slavery does not now exist, it cnn not be introducea by the Territorial Legislature. The clause itself was introduced into the bill by the Committee
for the purpose of tying up the hands of tho Territorial Legislature in respect to
legislating at all, one wny or the other, upon the subject of African slnvery. It wns
intended to leave the lcgislntion and the lnw of the respective Territories in the condition in which the Act ,,;11 find them. I stated on a former occasion that I did not,
iu Committee, ,·ote for tho amendment to insert the clause, though it was proposed
to be introduced by a majority of the Committee. I a_ttnchcd Very little consequence
to it at the time, and I attach very little to it nt present. It is perhaps of no particular importance whatever. Now, sir, if I understand the measure proposed by the
Senator from Mississippi, it aims nt the some thing. I do DOt understand him as
proposing that if any one shall carry slaves into the Territory-although by the laws
of the Territory he can not take them there-the legislatirn hands of the Territorial
government should be so tied ns to pre,·ent it sayin~ he shall not enjoy tho fruits of
their labor. If the Senator from Mississippi menus to say that- "

Mr. Davis:

"I do mean to say it."

Mr. Clay :

'' If tho object of tho Senator is to provide that slaves mny be introduced into the
Territory contrnry to the lex loci, and, being intredneed, notlliug shall be done by the
Legishiture to impair the rights of owners to hold the slaves thus brought contrnry
to the local lows, I ccrtainl!J can not vote for it. In cloing so I shall repent again the
expression of opinion which I announced at an early period of the session."

H ero we find the line distinctly drawn between those who contended for the right to c:irry slaves into the Territories and hold them
in defiance of the local law, and those who contended that such right
was subject to the local law of the T erritory. During the progress
of the discussion on the same day Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, said :
"We are giving, or proposing to give, a government to a Territory, which act
rests n)lon tl1e b!l.Sis of our right t-0 make such provision.
e suppose we J1ave a
right to confer power. If so, we may mark out the limit to which they may legislate,
and nre bound not to confer power beyond that which exists in Congress. If we
gh-e them power to legislate beyond tl1at we commit a fraud or usurpation, as it may
be done openly, covertly, or indirectly.

,v

To which Mr. Chy replied :

"Now, sir, I only repent whnt I have hnd occasion to say before, thnt while I am
willing to stand aside and make no JcgislatiYe enactment one way or the other- to
lay off the Territories witl1out the Wilmot P roviso, on the ono hand, with which I
understand we are threatened, or withou t an attempt to introduce a clause for the
introduction of slavery into the T erritories. While I nm for rejecting both the one
and the other, I am content that the law ns it exist.s shall prevail ; and if there be
any d iversity of opinion as to what it menus, I nm willing that it shall be settled by
the highest judicial a uthority of the country. While I nm content thus to abide the
result, I must say that I can not vote for nny express provision recognizing tho right
to carry sla¥CS there."
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To which Mr. Davis rejoined, that"It is said our Revolution gre; out of a preamble; and I hope we have something of the same character of the hardy men of the Revolution who first commenced
the war with the mother country-something of the spirit of that bold Yankee who
said he had a 1·ight to go to Concord, and that go he would ; and who, in the maintenance of that right, met his death at the hands of a British sentinel. Now, sir,
if our right to carry slaves into these Territories be a C0!15titut.ional right, it is our
first duty to maintain it."
·
•

Pending the discussion which ensued :Mr. Davis, at the suggestion
of friends, modified his ainendment from time to time, m1til it assumed
the following shape:

"Nor to introduce or exclude African slavery. Provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to prevent said Territorial Legislature from passing
such laws as may be necessary for the protection of the rights of property of every
kind which may have been, or may be hereaft.er, conformably to the Constitution of
the United States, held in or introduced into said Territory."

To which, on the same day, Mr. Chase, of Ohio, offered the following amendment:
.

.

"Provided farther, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as authorizing or permitting the introduction of slavery or the holding of persons as property
within said Territory."

Upon these amendments-the one affirming the pro-slavery and
the other the anti-slavery position, in opposition to the right of the
people of the Territories to decide the slavery question for themselves- Mi.·. Douglas said:
"The position that I have ever taken has been, that this, and all other questions
1-elating to the domestic affairs and domestic policy of the Territories, ought to be left
to the decision of the people themselves; and that we ought to be content with whatever way they may decide the question, because they have a much deeper interest in
these mntt.ers than we have, and know much better what institutions suit them than
we, who have never been there, c= decide for them. I would therefore have much
preferred that that portion of the bill should have remained as it was report.eel from
the Committee on Territories, with no provision on the subject of slavery, the one way
or the other. And I do hope yet that thnt clause will be stricken out. I am satisfied, sir, that jt gives no strength to the bill. I am satisfied, even if it did give
strength to it, that it ought not to be there, because it is a violation ofpr-,.,,dple-a
violation of that principle upon which we have all rested our defense of the course
we have taken on this question. I do not see how those of us who have taken the
position we have taken-that of non-intervention-and have argued in favor of the
right of the people to legislate for themselves on this question, can support such a
provision without abandoning all the arguments which we used in the Presidential
campaign in the year 1848, and the principles set forth by the honorable Senator
from :Michigan (Mr. Cass) in that Jetter which is known as the 'Nicholson Letter.'
e are required to abandon that platform; we are required to abandon those p1aµ1ciples, and to stultify ourseh•es, and to adopt the opposite doctrine-and for what?
In order to say that the people oftl,e Territories shall not have such instit..tions as they
shall deem adapted to their condition and their wants. I do not sec, sir, how such a
provision can be acceptable either to the people of tho North or the South."

,v

Upon the question, how many inhabitants a Territory should con-
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tain before it should be formed into a political community with the
rights of self-government, l\Ir. Douglas said:
"Tho Senator from Mississippi puts the question to me as to what number of
people there mnst be in n Territory before this right to govern themsclnis accrues.
Without determining the precise number, I will nssume that the tight onght to accrue to the people nt the moment they hnve enongh to constitute n government;
and, sir, the bill assumes. that there nre people enough there to require n government, nnd enough to authorize the people to govern tbemsch·es. ..... Your bill
concedes that a representative government is nccessary-n government founded upon
tho principles of popular sovereignty and the right of a people to enact their own
laws; and for this reason you give them a Lcgislnture composed of two brnnches,
like the Legislnturcs of the different States and Territories of tho Union. You confer upon them tho right to legislate on 'nil rightful subjects of legislation,' except
negroes. Why except ncgroes? 'Why e.'l:cept Africnn slavery? If tho inhabitants
are competent to g<ffern tbemseh'es upon all other subjects, and in reference to nil
other descriptions of property-if they aro competent to mnkc lnws and determine
tho relations between hnsband and wife, and parc,it and child, and municipul laws
affecting the rights and property of citizens g cncrnlly, they arc competent also to
make laws to govern themselves in relation to slavery and ncgroes."

With reference to the protection ofproperty in slaves, l\fr. Douglas
said:
" I have a word to sny to the honomble Senator from :Mississippi (Mr. Davis).
IIo insists that I am not in fiwor of protecting property, and that his amendment is
offered for the purpose of protecting property under the Consritution. Now, sir, I
ask yon what authority he has for assuming that? Do I not desire to protect property because I wish to allow the people to pass such lawS' ns they deem proper respecting their rights to property without any exception? Ile might just as well sny
that I am opposed to protecting property in merchandise, in steamboats, in cattle, in
rcnJ estate, as to say that I am opposed to protecting property of any other descrir>tion; for I desire to put them nil on an equality, and nllow the people to make their
own laws in respect to the whole of them."

Mr. Cass said (referring to the amendments offered by l\fr. Davis
and ~Ir. Chase):

"Now with respect to the nmentlments. I shall rnte against them both; and
then I shnll vote in favor of striking out the restriction in the bill upon the power of
the Territorial governments. I shall do so upon this ground. I was opposed, as the
honorable Senator from Kentucky bas declared he was, to the insertion of this prohibition by tl,e Committee. I consider it inexpedient and unconstitutional. I have
already stat~d my belief that the rightful power of internal legislation in the Territories belongs to the people."

After further discussion tho vote was taken by yeas and nays on
the amendment of M1·. Chase, and decided in the negative: Y cas, 25;
Nays, 30. Tho question recurring on the amendment of l\Ir. Davis,
of Mississippi, it was also rejected : Yeas, 25 ; Na,ys, 30. Whereupon J\Ir. Seward offered the following amendment :

"Neither slavery nor involuntary serritnde, othctWise thnn by conviction for crime,
shall ever be allowed in either ofsaid Territories of Utah and New Mexico."

Which was rejected-Yeas, 23 ; Nays, 33.
After various other amendments had been offered and voted upon
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- all relating to the power of the Territorial Legislature ove11 slavery
- Mr. Douglas moved to strike out all relating to African Slavery, so
that the Territorial Legislature should have the same power over
that question as over all other rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution- which amendment was rejected. .After
the rejection of this amendment, the discussion was renewed with
great ability and depth of feeling in respect to the powers which the
Territorial L_egislature should exercise upon the subject of slavery.
Various propositions were made, and amendments offered and rej ected- all relating to this one controverted point-when Mr. Norris,
of New Hampshire, renewed the motion ofMr. Douglas, to strike out
the restriction on the Territorial Legislature in respect to .African
Slavery. On the 31st of July this amendment was adopted by a vote
of 32 to 19-restoring this section of the bill to the form in which it
was reported from the Committee on Territories on the 25th of
March, and conferring on the Territorial Legislature power over " all
rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the
United States," witliout exc.epting African Slaveri.;.
Thus terminated this great struggle in the affirmance of.the principle, as the basis of the compromise measm·es of 1850, so far as they
related to the organization of the Territories, that the people of the
Te-rritoi·ies should decide the slavery question f oi· tliemsel,ves througli
the action of their Territorial Legislatures.
This controverted question having been definitely settled, the Senate proceeded on the same day to consider the other portions of the
bill, and after striking out all except those provisions which provided
for the organization of the Territory of Utah, ordered the bill to be
engrossed for a third reading, and on the next.day- August 1, 1850
-the bill was read a third time, and })assed.
On the 14th of August the bill for the organization of the T erritory of New Mexico was taken up, and amended so as to conform
fully to the provisions of the Utah Act in respect to the power of the
Territorial Legislature over " all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution," without excepting .African Slavery, and
was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading without a. division ;
ancl on the next day the bill was passed-Yeas, 27; Nays, 10.
These two bills were sent to the H ouse of Representatives, and
passed that body without any alteration in respect to the power of
the Tenitoria.l L egislatures over the subject of slavery, and were approved by President Filmore September 9, 1850.
In 1852, when the two great political parties-Whig and Democratic-into which the country was then divided, assembled in National Convention at Baltimore for the purpose of nominating candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency, each Convention
adopted and affirmed the principles embodied in the compromise
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measures of 1850 ns rules of action by which they would be governed in all future cases in the organization of Territolial governments
and the admission of new States.
On the 4th of January, 1854, the Committee on T erritories of the
Senate, to which had been referred a bill for the organization of the
Territory of Nebraska, reported the bill back, with an amendment,
in the form of a substitute for the entire bill, which, with some modifications, is now known on the statute book as the "Kansas-Nebraska
Act," accompanied by a Report explaining the principles upon which
it was proposed to organize those Territories, as follows:
"Tho principal amendments which your Committee deem it their duty to commend to the favorable action of tho Senato, in 11. special report, arc those in which
tho principles established by tho Compromise Measures of 1850, so far as they arc
applicable to territorial organizations, are proposed to be affirmed and carried into
practical operation within tho limits of tho new Territory. The wisdom of those
measures is attested, not loss by their salutary and beneficial effects in allaying seetional agitation and restoring peace and harmony to an irritated and distracted
people, than by the cordial and almost universal approbation with which they have
been rcccfrred and sanctioned by the whole country.
"In the judgment of your Committee, thoso measures were intended to have a far
more comprehensive and enduring effect than tho mcro adjustment of tho difficulties
arising out of the recent acquisition of Mexican territory. '!'hey were designed to
establish certain great principles, which would not only furnish adequate remedies
for existing evils, but, in all time to come, avoid t~e perils of a similar ngitation, by
withdrawing tho question of slavery from tho Halls of Congress and the political
arena, and committing it to the arbitrament of those who were immediately interested in nod alone responsible for its consequences. With a new of conforming their
action to the settled policy of the Government, sanctioned by the approving ,·oico of
the .American people, your Committee hnve deemed h their duty to incorporate and
perpetuate, in their territorial bill, the principle., and spirit of those measures."

.After presenting and reviewing certain provisions of the bill, the
Committee conclude as follows :
"From these provisions it is apparent that the Compromise Measures of 1850 affirm and rest upon tho following propositions:
"' First.-That all questions pertaining to slavery in the Territories, and in the
new States to be formed therefrom, are to be lei\ to tl10 decision of the people residing therein, by their appropriate representatives to be chosen by them for that purpose.
" 'Second.-Tbat nil cases involving title to slaves and questions of personal freedom, are referred to the adjudication of the local tribunnls, with the right of appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United States.
" 'Third.-Tbat tho provision of tho Constitution of the United States in respect
to fngitives from service, is to be carried into faithful execution in all the organized
Territories, the same as in tho States. The substitute for the bill which your Committee have prepared, and which is commended to the fnvorablo action ofthe Senate,
proposes to carry thcso propositions and principles into practical operation, in the
precise language of the Compromise Measures of 1850.' "

By reference to that section of the "Kansas-Nebraska Act" as it
now stands on the statute book, which prescribed and defined the
power of the Territorial Legislature, it will be seen that it is, "in the
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precise la~guago of the Compromise Me:isures of 1850," extending
the legislative power of the Territory "to all rightful subjects of
legislation consistent with the Constitution," without excepting African Slavery.
It having been suggested, with some plausibility, during the discussion of the bill, that the act of Congress of March 6, 1820, prohibiting slavery north of the parallel of 36° 301 would deprive tho
people of the Territory of the power of regulating the slavery question to suit themselves while they should remain in a territorial condition, and before they should have the requisite population to entitle
them to admission into the Union as a State, an amenclment was prepared by t he chairman of tho Committee, and incorporated into the
bill to remove this obstacle to the free exercise of the principle of
popular sovereignty in the Territory, while it remained in a territorial
condition, by repealing the said act of Congress, and declaring the
true intent and meaning of all the friends ofthe bill in these words:

"Thnt the Constitution and nil laws of the United Stntes which nre not locnlly innpplicnble, shnll hnve the same force and effect within the Territory as elsewhere
within the United Stat.cs, except the eighth section of the act prcpnratory to the admission of ;Missouri into the Union, approved March 6, 1820, which being inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the Stnlcs nod
Territories, as recognized by tho legislntion of 1850, commonly cnlled the 'Compromise Measures,' is hereby declared inoperative nnd void-it being the true intent and
meaning ofthis act not to kgislnte slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it
tl1erefrom, but to leave tlte people tllereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic i11stit1Jtions their own way, s1Jbject only to the Constit.,twn of tl1e United States."

To which was added, on motion of Mr. Badger, the following:

"Provi<kd, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to rev-i.-e or put in
force any law or regulntion which may haYe existed prior to the act of the sbuh of
March, 1820, either protecting, cstnblishing, or nbolishing slavery."

In this form, and with this distinct understanding of its "trne intent and meaning," the bill passed the two houses of Congress, and
became the la.w of the land by the approval of the President, May
30, 1854.
In 1856, the Democratic party, assembled in National Convention
at Cincinnati, declared by a unanimous vote of the delegates from
every State in the Union, that

"The American Democracy recognize and ndopt the principles containecl in the
organic laws establishing the Territories of Kansas and Nebl'nska ns embodying the
only sound and snfo solution of tho 'slavery question,' upon which the great national
iden of the people of this whole country can repose in its determined conservatism
of the Union-non-interference by Congress ,v-ith slnery in State and Territory, or
in the District of Columbia;"
"That this was the basis of tho Compromises of 1850, confirmed by both the
Democratic ancl Whig parties in National Conventions-ratified by the people in
the election of 1852-and rightly npplied to tho organization of the Territories in
1854; That by the uniform application of this Democratic principle to the organization of Territories and to the admission of new States, with or without domestic
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slavery as they may elect, the equal rights of all will be preservedintact-the original
compacts of the Constitution maintained inviolate-and the perpetuity and expansion
of this Union insured to its utmost capacity of embracing in peace and harmony any
future .American State that may be constituted or annex~d with a Republican form
ofgovernment."

Iu accepting the nomination of this Convention, Mr. Buchanan, in
a letter datecl June 16, ~856, said:
"The agitation on the question of domestic slavery has too long distracted and
divided the people of this Union, and alienated their affections from each other.
This agitation has assumed many forms since its commencement, but it now seems
to be directed chiefly to the Territories; and judging from its present character, I
think we may safely anticipate that it is rapidly approaching a 'finality.• The recent legislation of Congress respecting domestic slavery, derived, as it has been, from
the original and pure fountain of legitimate JJOlitical power, the will of the majority,
promises, ere long, to allay the dangerous excitement. This legislation is founded
upon principles as ancient as free government itself, and in accordance with them
has simply declared that the people of a Territory, like those of a State, sltall decida
for themselves wl1etlie,· sl.avery shall or shall not exist witltin tlteir limits."

.

.

This exposition ofthe history of these measures shows conclusivoly that the authors of the Compromise Measures of 1850, and of the
Kansas-Nebraska .Act of 1854, as well as the members of the Continental Congress of 1'7'74, and the founders of our system of government subsequent to the Revolution, J·egarded the l)eople of the Territories ancl Colonies as political Communities which were entitled to
a free and exclusive power of legislation in their Provincial Legislatures, where their representation could alone be preserved, in all
cases of taxation ancl internal polity. This right pertains to the
people collectively as a law-abiding and peaceful community, ancl not
to the isolated individuals who may wander upon the public domain
in violation of law. I t can only be exercised where there are inhabitants sufficient to constitute a government, and capable of performing
its various functions and duties-a fact to be ascertained and determined by Congress. Whether the number shall be fixed at ten, fif.
teen, or twenty thousand inhabitants does not affect the principle.
The principle, under our political system, is that every · distinct
political Community, loyal to the Constitution and the Union, is
entitleil to all tlie ?'ights, privileges, and immunities of selfgovernment in respect to their local concerns and internal polity, subject
only to the Constitution .o f tlw United States.

